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Abstract
Distributed information systems are critical to the func-
tioning of many businesses; designing them to be dependable
is a challenging but important task. We report our experience
in using formal methods to enhance processes and tools
for development of business information software based
on service-oriented architectures. In our work, which takes
place in an industrial setting, we focus on the configuration
of middleware, verifying application-level requirements in
the presence of faults. In pilot studies provided by SAP,
we used the Event-B formalism and the open Rodin tools
platform to prove properties of models of business protocols
and expose weaknesses of certain middleware configura-
tions with respect to particular protocols. We then ex-
tended the approach to use models automatically generated
from diagrammatic design tools, opening the possibility of
seamless integration with current development environments.
Increased automation in the verification process, through
domain-specific models and theories, is a goal for future
work.
KEYWORDS: Verification, Fault Modelling, Service-
Oriented Architectures, Event-B, Tool Support
1. Introduction
Many business information applications are large-scale
software systems that provide essential support to companies
in their business processes. Designing such systems for
dependability is therefore a demanding but important task.
The software engineering challenge is to integrate many or-
ganisational parts and functions into one large and complex
but consistent system.
The principles of service-oriented architecture (SOA) can
help to master the complexity of business information ap-
plications. In SOA systems, such as those manufactured by
SAP, complex applications are composed from independent
business components that offer enterprise services. In a
typical business application, several hundreds of service
components may communicate with each other. Although
the basic communication protocols are usually not individ-
ually complex, the large number of them means that the
detection of problems, such as race conditions, requires
considerable effort if performed manually. There is therefore
an argument for investigating machine-assisted verification
of these applications.
Although SOA can help to manage complexity, the design
decisions for business information applications, especially
those made at early stages, are critical because, if made
wrongly, they can be expensive to correct later. This is
particularly true of decisions relating to the dependability
characteristics of components and systems, such as fault
assumptions. Formal modelling and analysis techniques offer
the possibility of analysing design alternatives at an early
development stage, and to a level of rigour not supported
by conventional approaches.
In spite of the potential benefits, formal methods are
rarely used in the development of business information
systems. This is in part because they are often associated
with high-cost critical applications, and in part because
they are perceived to present high barriers to adoption in
terms of the training required and the modifications to
existing processes and tools. Successful developers therefore
have little incentive to adopt them. Our work as part of
the European Deploy project [1] aims to achieve a long-
term deployment of formal methods rather than a “one-off”
demonstration of their capability. We therefore aim to lower
some of these barriers to adoption by providing developers
with a modelling and analysis capability that requires a
relatively small change to current best practice.
In the light of these conditions, our work aims to answer
three questions. First, can state-of-the-art formal modelling
and analysis technology be used beneficially in the early
design stages of dependable SOA-based business informa-
tion systems of the kind developed by SAP? Second, what
level of support is possible and can it be integrated smoothly
with existing development practice? Third, what advances
are needed in formal methods support to make this approach
as effective as possible?
In this paper, we report on the results of initial studies in
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answer to our questions. We have investigated the early-stage
application of formal methods to the problem of determining
the reliability attributes required from SOA middleware to
correctly design a business information application using a
certain set of services. This analysis is supported by the
Event-B formalism and Rodin tools and integrated with
existing graphical design notations in SAP. In Section 2
we consider the industrial setting of our studies. Section 3
describes the formalism used, the modelling of faults and
our approach to the achievement of successful deployment.
We then describe the pilot studies undertaken (Section 4),
the lessons learned (Section 5) and the directions of future
work (Section 6).
2. The Industrial Setting
Our work concerns SOA-based business information sys-
tems of the kind developed using SAP technology. In
this setting, developers construct applications that support
companies’ business processes, using components describing
parts of processes such as buying, selling, planning, site
logistics and accounting. These components, based on an
SOA, form a complex network using (mostly asynchronous)
messaging to satisfy the components’ communication needs
without giving up their loose coupling.
In an ideal development process, the internals of the com-
ponents are designed alongside their communication with
other components. Developers decide on the inbound and
outbound service interfaces and operations the components
offer, as well as on the types and structure of the messages.
The developers then also decide on how to configure the pro-
cess integration layer or middleware (e.g., SAP NetWeaver
Process Integration [2]) which is responsible for actually
transferring the messages.
In current practice, the design steps sketched above are
accompanied by modelling the systems with the help of
domain-specific diagrammatic languages. A strict validation
process is in place to manually check the models for con-
sistency. Then, the models are transformed into executable
code and the code is tested.
A significant source of errors in distributed systems is
poor communication media, which can, for example, de-
lay, corrupt, reorder, lose or duplicate messages. Typical
examples of such media are the internet and wireless intra-
organisational networks. Consequently, the configuration of
the middleware is one of the most significant parts of the
development process. This includes the choice of one of
a set of reliability attributes as defined by the WS Reliable
Messaging [3] standard. These include that messages should
arrive “exactly once” (EO), or “exactly once in order”
(EOIO). EOIO middleware will deliver all messages sent
between two parties in the order they are sent without losing,
corrupting or duplicating them and without inserting any
new random messages, while EO middleware is the same
except that it may reorder messages.
The choice of middleware attributes for an application
can have serious consequences on both maintenance and
bandwidth costs. An EOIO configuration bears a higher
risk of blocking queues, affecting maintenance costs. For
example, consider an error occurring at the application level
when processing input from an EOIO channel. Such errors
most often have to be resolved by manual effort. While the
repair is being effected, all other EOIO messages behind
the blocked one remain blocked; an EO middleware might
have allowed such messages to pass the blocking one,
which may be judged as “better” behaviour. There are also
consequences for bandwidth cost, since EOIO requires more
effort at a lower protocol level for creating and closing
message sequences. On the other hand, carelessly deciding
on a weaker middleware that is eventually discovered not
to provide strong enough guarantees for the application will
lead to high costs in revising the design and implementation.
Given its significance, we focus on the configuration of
middleware as an example of design decision that could be
supported by formal modelling and analysis tools. Models
of communicating business objects can be combined with
models of different middlewares (Figure 1), allowing, at an
early stage of design, the selection of the least expensive
middleware that offers sufficient guarantees for the applica-
tion to operate correctly.
Figure 1. Choosing middlewares
3. Technology and Deployment Strategy
The goal of our work is to assess the feasibility of
applying state-of-the-art formal modelling techniques in the
development of dependable SOA-based business information
applications in the industrial setting described above. We
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have taken a practical approach to this by developing and
analysing formal models of real protocols that are imple-
mented in business information applications, using a formal
method and tools that have potential to be integrated with
existing processes and tools. In order to do this, we first
require a formal modelling and analysis framework that has
robust tool support. Second, we need a means of expressing
and analysing faults in middleware. Third, we require an
approach to deployment of the formalism and tools into
practice in the industrial setting outlined in Section 2. We
discuss our response to each of these requirements below.
3.1. Event-B and the Rodin Platform
We have used the Event-B modelling formalism [4] and
the Rodin [5] tools platform. Event-B and Rodin have
several features that make them appropriate as a basis for
our study. The formal modelling language allows description
both of structured data and functionality. The available ab-
stractions form a promising basis for describing information
systems applications. The use of the Eclipse framework as
a basis for the Rodin platform means that the tools may
be extended with specialised provers, interpreters, model
checkers, pretty printers and other new capabilities. The
availability and extensibility of a range of such tools is
important. The openness of the Rodin tools platform is also
an important factor in integration with existing development
environments.
Event-B uses a model-oriented language in which data is
modelled through a collection of built-in abstract data types
from which more sophisticated types may be constructed.
Data values may be constrained by logical predicates in the
form of invariants. State variables modelling persistent data
may be modified by events which describe functionality.
Events are guarded by conditions that must hold in order
for them to be enabled. The functionality performed by an
event is described as an action.
The basic unit of an Event-B model is a machine. Each
machine may include invariants and events. The logical
conjecture that a machine is internally consistent (e.g. that
events will not cause invariant properties to be violated) is
given as a collection of proof obligations. Proof obligations
may be discharged manually or, more likely, with the aid of
an automated proof tool. Definitions of carrier sets (which
model abstract types) and constants may be defined in units
called contexts, which are visible to machines.
Figure 2 gives a fragment from an Event-B machine.
The syntax is slightly simplified. Three invariants and one
event are shown. The first two invariants restrict the type of
(previously declared) variables a and b. The event change
uses a parameter x. A proof tool quickly demonstrates that
the event respects the first and third invariants, but the
proof obligation arising from the second invariant cannot be
proved because it would be violated if the event change were
performed when b > 95. To make the machine consistent,
either the second invariant or the event definition must be
changed.
invariants:
inv1 a ∈ N
inv2 b ∈ 1 .. 100
inv3 a < b
change
any x where
x ∈ 1..5
then
a := a+ x
b := b+ x
end
Figure 2. An Event-B fragment
A system model in Event-B typically consists of a chain
of Event-B machines. Each machine (apart from the first) is
linked to its predecessor by a refinement relation. Linking
invariants relate the state of a machine with the state of its
predecessor. Proof obligations ensure behaviour preservation
between the linked machines. In a typical Event-B model,
the initial machine is extremely simple, with detail being
added in a controlled way step by step through a chain of
refinements.
Using the Rodin tools platform, Event-B machines and re-
finement steps are constructed via a model editing interface.
Proof obligations are automatically generated and discharged
(so far as is possible) by proof tools built into the platform.
In the event of an obligation not being automatically proved,
an interface for manual proof guidance is used. In the work
reported here, we focus mainly on the proof capability of
the platform. Achieving a high level of automated proof
is, however, important for our studies because we aim
to give developers the benefits of proof-based analysis of
models without the overhead of interacting directly with the
formalism and proof tools.
3.2. Fault Modelling
Our second requirement is for a means of modelling and
analysing faults in middleware. A fault is the cause of a
system entering a state (termed an error state) that may
lead to the system’s deviating from specified behaviour,
such deviant behaviour being termed a failure [6]. A failure
of a component may in turn cause an error in the system
of which it is a part, continuing the causal chain. A fault
assumption is a specification of deviant behaviour that it
is assumed may occur. For example, fault assumptions for
distributed systems may include omission faults, faults in
timing, value, state transition, impromptu and crash failures
of the components [7], [8]. Stating such fault assumptions
explicitly allows them to be brought into the design process
so that appropriate fault tolerance [9] mechanisms can be
selected and applied. Such mechanisms usually rely on the
use of appropriate error detection and recovery techniques
that bring the system back to a non-error state.
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Formal specification and verification of fault tolerance
properties is an area of active research (e.g. [10]), as
is formal reasoning about correctness of distributed fault
tolerance protocols (e.g. [11]) and formal specification and
verification of fault tolerance connectors (e.g. [12]). Most
of the approaches to modelling fault tolerance start with
understanding and specifying fault assumptions, followed
by defining appropriate fault tolerance mechanisms such as
exception handling, replication, error monitoring or recon-
figuration.
In our study fault tolerance is not always integrated into
the application but rather is dealt with at the middleware
level – the challenge is in selecting a sufficiently fault-
tolerant middleware to guarantee key properties of the appli-
cation working over that middleware. In an Event-B model
of a business application over a SOA, fault assumptions
might be recorded by including events that take the model
into error states. For example, in an Event-B model of
one of our business information systems, an assumption of
omission failure in the middleware might be recorded by an
additional “fault” event in the machine that is capable of
“dropping” messages in transit. The verification challenge
is in showing that middleware which has such events does
or does not invalidate a system-level property expressed as
an invariant.
3.3. Industrial Deployment
Our third requirement is for an approach to deployment
of the formalism and tools into industrial practice. Our
approach here is to use Event-B in a “lightweight” way [13]
in the sense that full formalism is used but is applied
to key aspects of a system and with a significant level
of tool support. Recent applications of formal verification
technology in static analysis and model checking, such as
SLAM [14] and ESP [15], have been characterised by the
integration of formal analysis with existing development
frameworks. Our application differs from some of these in
that our focus is on early design stages rather than code
verification but we share the need to integrate verification
analysis with existing design tools.
The scale and character of the SOA-based business infor-
mation systems that we consider in this paper, with large
numbers of service components engaged in protocols also
suggests that the formal modelling and analysis technology
must be readily used by a wide range of developers without
requiring a sudden revolution in development processes and
tools. Our approach therefore aims for a smooth transition
from traditional development processes to the use of more
formal techniques. Initially, developers might not directly
interact with a formal modelling tool, but continue to
use pre-existing diagrammatic domain-specific modelling
environments. The models developed in these environments
could be automatically translated into a suitable formal
notation and treated with automated analysis tools. While the
insights gained from such purely automatic analysis might
be less than those arising from a more thorough adoption, we
expect that the formal methods would be seen by developers
as a benefit demanding little additional effort. In the long
run, we expect that subjectively experienced and objectively
measurable benefits will lead to a positive attitude towards
the methods and tools and then to their more extensive direct
use.
4. The Pilot Studies
As indicated in Section 1, the purpose of our study
is to determine the technical feasibility of using formal
modelling (in Event-B/Rodin) to support the analysis of
design models of SOA-based business information appli-
cations. The specific focus is on selecting an appropriate
configuration for middleware from among alternatives offer-
ing different levels of fault tolerance (EO or EOIO). The
application models should be derived automatically from
existing graphical design tools and there should be a good
level of automation in the analysis of the models.
Our approach to answering the three questions posed in
Section 1 is to use a series of case studies, with the aim
of producing a proof-of-concept of the automated analysis
discussed above. In our studies, we needed to:
1) Establish that formal proof tools such as Event-
B/Rodin can indeed support the comparison of al-
ternative middleware components with respect to
application-level properties.
2) Define the process for interfacing alternative mid-
dleware models (e.g. EO or EOIO) to pre-existing
application-level models.
3) Develop appropriate strategies for combining middle-
ware models with application models derived from the
pre-existing graphical design tools so as to yield a
good degree of automation in the analysis.
These are the subjects of the studies described in Sec-
tions 4.1 to 4.3 respectively. The studies used two realistic
but simplified SOA choreography examples. They represent
a large class of business information protocols deployed in
industry. The first example is a business-to-business (B2B)
choreography (or protocol) [16]. Two components, a buyer
and seller, exchange messages in order to negotiate the
price of a product or service. The negotiation is initiated
by a proposal from the buyer detailing purchase conditions
such as price, quantity, or delivery date. The two parties
may then arbitrarily exchange further proposals. A party
indicates agreement to a proposal by returning that proposal.
The negotiation may be cancelled at any time. The critical
property that B2B is designed to establish is:
Property 1: When a run of the protocol terminates, either
the buyer and seller should have agreed to the same price,
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or they should agree that the negotiation has been cancelled.
The second example is an application-to-application (A2A)
choreography in which two components interact to meet
a requirement from a customer. The ordering component
is responsible for managing customer requirements, and
the supply chain requirements component coordinates the
services used to process these requirements. The protocol
starts when the supply chain component receives customer
requirements from the ordering component. The supply
chain component may then send notification of (partial)
fulfilment of these requirements (e.g. delivery) back to the
ordering component. The ordering component may also send
queries and preliminary reservation requests and the supply
chain component sends current supply planning and delivery
information to the ordering component.
4.1. Study 1: Middleware Models
The aim of the initial study was to confirm that the Event-
B/Rodin tools could support the comparison of alternative
middleware components with respect to application-level
properties. It used the B2B protocol. The application is built
from a buyer and a seller component, and either EO or EOIO
middleware. Our method was first to build Event-B models
of EO and EOIO middleware, and an abstract model of the
B2B protocol that did not contain an explicit component
representing middleware. Each of the middleware models
was composed in turn with the B2B model, and the Event-
B/Rodin tools were used to compare the two combinations.
Each application-level event involves both a protocol party
(buyer or seller) and the middleware, and the protocol and
middleware models therefore contain a local description of
each application event. The protocol model describes the
effects of the event local to the buyer or seller and the
middleware model describes the effects of the action local
to the middleware. Composing the middleware with the
protocol involves composing each of these actions.
The protocol model contains, in effect, two independent
state machines, one modelling the buyer and one modelling
the seller. All variables are local to one or other of these ma-
chines, and all events read and influence the local variables
of only one machine. The state variable last s o rec is
the last seller offer received by the buyer. BAgreeStatus and
BCancelStatus record whether or not the protocol has been
agreed or cancelled, from the point of view of the buyer.
The current buyer offer is given by curr b o. The variables
last b o rec, SAgreeStatus, SCancelStatus, and curr s o
are the corresponding local variables in the seller.
If the last offer received by the buyer (last s o rec) is the
same as the current buyer offer, the buyer believes the parties
are in agreement. This is also true, mutatis mutandis, for the
seller. The important invariants in this model are therefore
the ones given in Figure 3. These are local invariants, in the
invariants:
inv1 BAgreeStatus = Agreement⇒
curr b o = last s o rec
inv2 SAgreeStatus = Agreement⇒
curr s o = last b o rec
Figure 3. Buyer and Seller invariants
sense that inv1 involves only variables local to the buyer,
and inv2 applies uses only variables local to the seller. For
example, the application-level event of the buyer sending a
proposal p to the seller appears in the protocol model as
Buyer send (see Figure 4). PROPOSAL is a carrier set
defined in a context visible to the protocol model. It contains
all legitimate proposals; empty and cancel are designated
elements of PROPOSAL. This event describes the case
where the buyer is sending an offer not in agreement with the
last offer from the seller. A separate event, which describes
the case where the buyer is in agreement with the seller,
additionally sets BAgreeStatus to Agreement.
Buyer send
any p where
p ∈ PROPOSAL
p 6∈ {empty, cancel}
p 6= last s o rec
BAgreeStatus = NoAgreement
BCancelStatus = NotCancelled
then
curr b o := p
end
Figure 4. Buyer send in the protocol
EO middleware
Figure 5 shows the EO model invariants. These describe
the structure of the middleware. There are two variables
mware to seller and mware to buyer, representing the
middleware carrying messages to the seller and buyer re-
spectively. Each is a partial function representing two bags
recording the number of proposals in the middleware, but
not the order in which they were sent.
invariants:
inv1 mware to seller ∈ PROPOSAL 7→ N1
inv2 mware to buyer ∈ PROPOSAL 7→ N1
Figure 5. EO invariants
In the case where the proposal is not yet in the middle-
ware, the local effects of the buyer sending a proposal are
defined in the event Buyer send mw, shown in Figure 6.
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A separate event describes the case where the proposal being
sent is already in the middleware.
Buyer send mw
any p where
p 6∈ dom(mware to seller)
then
mware to seller(p) := 1
end
Figure 6. Buyer send in EO middleware
Combining two events into one retains shared parameters
(in this case p), and conjoins guards and actions. In this
way, each event in the protocol model is combined with the
appropriate event from the middleware model to create an
application-level event. This process may be automated by
a composition plugin available for the Event-B tool [17].
Property 1 is formulated as two invariants in the combined
protocol and EO model. One of these, which covers the case
where the buyer and seller agree, is given in Figure 7. For
the invariant to hold, there must be no messages in transit.
invariants:
inv20 (BAgreeStatus = Agreement ∧
SAgreeStatus = Agreement ∧
mware to buyer = ∅ ∧
mware to seller = ∅)
⇒ curr b o = curr s o
Figure 7. Property 1 in EO
We are required to prove that every event upholds this
invariant. This cannot be done when the B2B protocol
runs on EO middleware. The proof obligations that fail
come from the events associated with the buyer and seller
receiving final proposals from the other party. At this stage,
the value of the AgreeStatus variables changes to Agreement,
without a guarantee that curr b o and curr s o are equal.
A sequence of events which falsifies Property 1 is depicted
in Figure 8, in which both the buyer and the seller accept old
proposals as representing the current state of the other party.
This sequence was anticipated (it was known beforehand that
the B2B protocol did not run on EO middleware) and can be
identified on the combined model using an Event-B animator
(e.g. ProB [18] or AnimB [19]).
EOIO middleware
Figure 9 shows the invariants in the EOIO middleware
model. Invariants 1 and 2 fix the middleware structure as a
partial function from a range of numeric labels (1 .. bufsize)
to the carrier set PROPOSAL. The variable bufsize is
defined in the context, and allows us to specify the largest
number of messages a middleware can carry. This finiteness
Figure 8. Falsifying Property 1
invariants:
inv1 mware to seller ∈
1 .. bufsize 7→ PROPOSAL
inv2 mware to buyer ∈
1 .. bufsize 7→ PROPOSAL
inv3 b rpos ∈ N
inv4 s rpos ∈ N
inv5 b wpos ∈ N
inv6 s wpos ∈ N
inv7 b rpos ≤ s wpos
inv8 s rpos ≤ b wpos
inv9 dom(mware to seller) = 1 .. b wpos
inv10 dom(mware to buyer) = 1 .. s wpos
Figure 9. EOIO invariants
restriction allows the model to be animated. The read and
write position variables defined in invariants 3 to 6 record
the last positions read from and written to by the buyer and
seller. Messages are written and read in order, and the read
position of one component must not pass the write position
of the other component (invariants 7 and 8). The domain of
the partial functions is therefore 1..∗ wpos, (where ∗ stands
for b or s) and this is asserted by invariants 9 and 10.
The definition of the buyer send event in EOIO is given
in Figure 10. A new PROPOSAL can only be added to the
middleware if the maximum number of messages (bufsize)
has not already been reached. When a new proposal is
received, it is added to the middleware sequence and the
write position is increased by one.
Property 1 is formulated as two invariants in the com-
bined protocol and EOIO model. One of these is given
in Figure 11. It differs from the EO formulation because
the middleware structure is different. In the case of EOIO
middleware, the middleware is empty when the value of
each read position variable is equal to the value of the
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Buyer send mw
any p where
p 6∈ dom(mware to seller)
b wpos < bufsize
then
mware to seller :=
mware to seller ∪ {b wpos+ 1 7→ p}
b wpos := b wpos+ 1
end
Figure 10. Buyer send in EOIO middleware
corresponding write position variable.
invariants:
(BAgreeStatus = Agreement ∧
SAgreeStatus = Agreement ∧
b rpos = s wpos ∧ s rpos = b wpos)
⇒
last b o rec = last s o rec
Figure 11. Property 1 as an invariant under EOIO
All the proof obligations generated by Rodin for the
combined model can now be discharged, guaranteeing that
Property 1 holds.
4.2. Study 2: Refinement-based modelling and anal-
ysis
In this study our aim was to further investigate how to
develop models of business applications which allow for the
introduction of middleware representations from a range of
components and to develop standards for the integration of
middleware into application models.
The middleware models were integrated with an indepen-
dently developed model of the B2B protocol. This allowed
a clearer identification of the interface between the middle-
ware and the protocol parties, and the development a set
of guidelines for protocols developers wishing to use the
middleware.
The identified guidelines include:
• protocol parties should be developed in one machine,
with no representation of middleware. Each send or
receive event should instead use a reserved variable
name as a parameter (e.g. “p” in Section 4.1).
• correctness criteria for the protocol should be ex-
pressed as application invariants, (although they will
not in general be provable before a middleware model
is integrated).
• complex message sets should be defined in a new
context visible to both the protocol model and the
middleware model.
• carrier sets should be instantiated to the messages the
protocol parties exchange.
Figure 12. Two refinement techniques
4.3. Study 3: Investigating modelling options
Process components and middleware may be modelled
in many different ways. The choice of level of abstraction
and the particular representations of the data and events has
an impact on the ease of comprehension and the ease of
automated analysis. In this study, we sought to find suitable
representations that would support automated analysis where
the process component models are derived from the pre-
existing modelling language and tools.
We used two different refinement techniques to produce
a new machine containing EOIO middleware, illustrated in
Figure 12. The first technique produced the new machine
by refining a machine in the original model containing the
abstract choreography, and the second by refining a machine
containing the low-level behaviour of the protocol.
An Event-B model of the A2A protocol was auto-
matically generated from existing diagrammatic domain-
specific modelling languages, rather than hand-crafted. It
contained two machines, m_choreography and EO_A2A.
The first machine, m_choreography, had a high-level
view of behaviour and no explicit component representing
the middleware. It contained seven events and two invariants,
and produced no proof obligations. The second machine,
EO_A2A, contained the local behaviour of the ordering
and supplier components and a model of EO middleware.
In EO_A2A each of the events from m_choreography
was refined by a “send” and a “receive” event, giving 14
events. It had 22 invariants and 268 proof obligations of
which 263 were proved automatically and 5 required (trivial)
intervention.
To investigate the modelling options, two machines
containing EOIO middleware were developed by hand.
EOIO_A2A_ONE was a refinement of m_choreography
and EOIO_A2A_TWO was a refinement of EO_A2A.
There were 257 proof obligations in EOIO_A2A_ONE,
162 of which were proved automatically. The remaining
95 were significantly more complex than the invariants in
EO_A2A.
The primary source of the increased complexity was ten
invariants that relate messages in middleware to states within
the machine. This can be seen by considering the definitions
of the quantity of a message M in each middleware. The
EO middleware representation is an unordered bag named
channel. In the EO middleware, the quantity of a message
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M in the middleware is given as channel(M).
In EOIO_A2A_ONE the middleware representation is a
sequence of type
1 .. bufsize 7→MESSAGES
and the quantity of a messageM in middlewaremw is given
by
card(dom((f .. l / mw) . {M}))
where f and l are the first and last unread messages
in mw. While proofs containing the first definition were
straightforward for the autoprovers, proofs containing the
second definition required manual guidance.
EOIO_A2A_TWO includes EO_A2A in the refine-
ment chain. Linking invariants are defined between
EOIO_A2A_TWO and EO_A2A. This gave rise to 25 invari-
ants in EOIO_A2A_TWO. Seven of these link the value of
the middleware variables in EOIO_A2A_TWO to the value
of the middleware variables in EO_A2A, and all have the
form
channel(M) = card(dom((f .. l / mw) . {M}))
where M ∈MESSAGES. EOIO_A2A_TWO contains 186
proof obligations, of which 116 were proved automatically.
The majority of the invariants that required manual proof
were the linking invariants between the two middleware
representations.
The benefit of the first approach is that there is no need
for the local machine EO_A2A. It represents the case where
a machine containing a representation of EO middleware
is not available, or the developer is interested exclusively in
EOIO middleware. The (overwhelming) disadvantage is that
the level of manual intervention required to prove the proof
obligations is too high. Conversely, the second approach
requires an intermediate machine (EO_A2A) to be built and
proved. It represents the case where a machine containing a
representation of EO middleware is available to be used.
The level of manual intervention required for the proofs
at the second refinement stage is manageable, although we
believe it could be further reduced significantly.
5. Lessons
This paper has reported our first steps towards answering
the three questions posed in Section 1. We have so far
conducted three pilot studies in order to assess the feasibility
of using verification tools to support the configuration of
middleware components for dependable business informa-
tion applications built on service-oriented architectures, and
to understand better the work required to support this in
an industrial setting like that of SAP. How have we fared
against each of those three basic questions?
First, can state-of-the-art formal modelling technology be
used beneficially in early design stages in this context? Our
experience, even in Study 1, has shown that it is possible to
use the Event-B language and tools to analyse design alter-
natives in the manner described, assessing the consequences
of selecting different middleware configurations, augmenting
the engineering judgement and experience that form the
basis of such design decisions at present. The conjectures
that can already be proved represent a step forward from
the level of informal analysis offered by manual analysis
and less formal design tools. The level of abstraction in the
models allows this analysis to be done at an early stage in
the development process.
The discovery of an invalid conjecture during verification
may lead to either the selection of a middleware configu-
ration offering stronger guarantees or the redesign of the
process components to handle the identified faults. As a
general observation, we think that the selection of stronger
middleware needs to be traded off against the possible
increase in complexity of protocol and component logic that
results from the latter course of action. The advantage of
our approach appears to be that this trade-off, which must
be done at some point during system design, can be done
explicitly and at an early design stage.
Our second question asked what level of formal support
is possible and whether it is capable of smooth integration
with existing practice. In Study 3, we were able to analyse
formal Event-B models derived from designs expressed in
an existing graphical notation, suggesting that this link
could work well. There are some important challenges here.
One is reducing the number of failing proofs. Another is
communicating information about failing proofs to a user
unfamiliar with the formalism. Our ability to discriminate
between suitable and unsuitable middlewares is limited by
the capabilities of the proof framework. In particular, failure
to prove a property of middleware does not necessarily mean
that the property does not hold. Thus a proportion of proof
failures are “false alarms”, as is inevitable in an expressive
formal language.
Our third question asked what advances are needed in
formal methods support to make this approach as effective as
possible. The verification technology that we have studied is
intended for broad deployment in the sense that a large num-
ber of developers will use the tools without needing deep
training in Event-B directly, although we expect that, in time,
a proportion of developers would like to interact directly
with the Rodin platform. This implies that the degree of
automation in the verification process is important. Although
a large proportion of proof obligations are discharged by
the tools without user intervention, the overall proportion is
rather lower than for some Event-B applications1, suggesting
that this level of automation can be raised substantially [20].
As we discovered in Study 2, it is important to select a
1. The manual proof obligations for EOIO_A2A_TWO in Study 3 took
around 6 person-hours to discharge.
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good series of refinement steps to introduce a middleware
model to a protocol, and considerable care is needed to
choose abstractions which are effective in proof. Our ob-
jective is high automation in proof, but there is a risk that
the models produced are less easily comprehended by the
human reader. This is a challenge we expect to address in
the future.
The protocols and middleware that we have examined
so far are realistic, although relatively simple. As Study 3
showed, there are many modelling options and trade-offs
that can affect ease of comprehension, the richness of fault
assumptions considered and the degree of automation in
proof.
Although our results are preliminary at this stage, our
observation is that this level of automated analysis represents
a good trade-off of time for insight [21]. In the longer term,
we expect that some enhanced support for failing proofs will
prove valuable.
6. Future Work
Both the level of automation and the power of the tools to
discriminate valid and invalid conjectures can be improved
substantially. In Event-B, the refinement chain breaks the
verification task down into steps that can be handled more
readily by tools. In our case, when the middleware model is
introduced in two refinement steps the proportion of proofs
automatically discharged is substantially higher than when
the middleware is introduced in a single step. A more sophis-
ticated approach to the introduction of the middleware model
could have a further significant effect on our automated
proof completion rates. We expect further improvements
in the level of automation from the ongoing developments
of the Rodin provers, tactics and theories, encouraged by
the openness of the platform. For example, one interesting
possibility lies in using model-checking technology such as
ProB [18] to identify a proportion of invalid conjectures
before attempts at proof are made. Some of the potential
of such a tools coupling has, for example, been explored
with the SAL model-checker and PVS theorem prover [22].
We often wish to express reliability as a probability value
(for example, the probability of failure on demand), or as
the probability of a failure in a time period (as a probability
distribution function.) Rodin does not support probabilistic
primitives directly, although research on integrating such
primitives into Event-B/Rodin is being carried out within
the DEPLOY project.
Although we have focussed on an immediate industrial
benefit, the breadth of possible applications suggests that
there may be value in developing a library of middleware
models (represented as patterns [23]) offering different fault
assumptions corresponding to a range of media including
wireless, internet and other communications mechanisms. A
suitable structure for such a library may be a lattice, similar
to the lattice of failure modes in [8].
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